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ABSTRACT: This article concerns itself with why and how activists persevere and manage to reproduce 
themselves as activists in contexts where they experience what is described as routine “failure”, taking 
Lebanon’s activist scene as its focus. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork carried out when Lebanon’s civil 
society was dominated by members of the country’s cosmopolitan professional middle class, I emphasise the 
affective dimensions of activism, the role that personal desires, emotions and anxieties play in enabling 
activists to persist in the most stagnant of conjunctures but that also, at the same time, keep them from 
advancing their agendas.  
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This article concerns itself with why and how activists persevere and manage to reproduce themselves as 
activists in contexts where they experience what is described as routine “failure”, taking Lebanon’s activist 
scene as its focus. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2016 and 2018, when Lebanon’s 
civil society was dominated by members of the country’s cosmopolitan professional middle class, I 
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emphasise the affective dimensions of activism, the role that personal desires, anxieties and emotions play in 
enabling activists to persist in the most stagnant of conjunctures, but that also keep them from advancing 
their agendas.  
I argue that an attentiveness to affect allows us to make sense of the complexities and contradictions of 
activist life and labour, and of the impact that neoliberalism as a governing rationality has had on activism. 
To understand why Lebanon’s cosmopolitan professional middle class has come to play such a prominent 
role within the country’s civil society, how it has managed to persist in the face of routinised failure, and the 
shape that its activism has taken, I argue that we must turn our attention to what Gould (2009) calls the 
“emotional habitus” of this class (10), embracing both the emotional turn in the scholarship on social 
movements (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001) and the anthropological call to take up intimacy as an 
analytic when studying dissent (Kelly 2019).  
I arrived in Beirut, the Lebanese capital, for fieldwork in the summer of 2016 to a civil society I found to 
be surprisingly lively given the petering out of the “garbage protests” the summer prior – an unprecedented, 
at the time, grassroots political mobilisation that was quick to lose momentum.1 Much has been said about 
why the garbage protests, or Hirak, did not last more than a few months. Activists and scholars have pointed 
to disagreements over discourse and strategy, and to the inability to bridge the divide between 
revolutionaries and reformists (Nayel and Moghnieh 2015; Kerbage 2017; Khneisser 2019; Chamas 2020). 
They have also pointed out the role that egos and competitiveness played in the inability to build a broad-
based activist alliance (Khneisser 2018). All of this, moreover, is said to have prevented the development of 
a strong alternative to government discourse that could prove worth rallying around for the many non-
activists who gathered in Beirut’s streets during that electric summer.  
As the movement evaporated and was relegated to memory, it became yet another reminder of the 
Lebanese ruling class’ resilience; its ability to survive crisis after crisis of its own making and, paradoxically, 
position itself as the only safeguard against total collapse or all-out war. The perpetual resurrection of the 
status quo has produced a ubiquitous sense of “stuckedness” for many in Lebanon (Hage 2015), productive 
of a resignation to bearing with a deeply entrenched condition. What, then, accounts for the perseverance of 
civil society activists?  
In the aftermath of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war (1975-1990), the country’s civil society sector grew 
substantially. Khneisser (2019) writes that by April 2014, Lebanon was home to 8,311 registered civil 
society organisations (3).2 In the aftermath of the Hirak, Lebanese civil society came to be dominated, in 
particular, by middle-class professionals – engineers, architects, urbanists, lawyers and doctors, who saw in 
their expertise the potential for the country’s salvation. In this article, I concern myself with the activism of 
Lebanon’s cosmopolitan, professional middle class. I ask what drew a significant portion of this class 
 
1 The garbage protests erupted in response to a waste crisis provoked by governmental mismanagement. At the time, they 
constituted the most significant cross-confessional, cross-class mobilisation since the end of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war 
[1975-1990] (Kerbage 2017).  
2 This number does not factor in the many unregistered, less formal groupings also active in the country. Scholars tend to 
distinguish between what is referred to as independent political activism in Lebanon and the country’s NGO-dominated (in 
both form and content) civil society sector (Kingston 2013; Naber and Zaatari 2014; Khattab 2015; Musallam 2016; Khneisser 
2019). There is sometimes overlap between NGOs and independent activist collectives and organisations, but there is also 
substantial criticism amongst independent activists, particularly those who identify with radical or revolutionary leftist 
currents, of the NGO sector, which many consider to be a depoliticising force (Nayel and Moghnieh 2015). Many independent 
activists do not consider themselves a part of civil society, despite having to engage with it, because it is seen to be dominated 








towards activism, and how and why these activists have been able to remain committed in an environment 
characterised by “stuckedness”, haunted by a history of what was described to me as activist “failure”. 
I attempt to address these questions by looking to the personal desires and anxieties that both propel and 
stifle professional middle-class activists in Beirut, exploring the link between middle-class habitus, the 




What follows draws on two continuous years of participant-observation with influential organisations and 
collectives from within what Harb (2016) has called Beirut’s urban social movement: The Civil Campaign to 
Protect the Dalieh of Raouche (also known as the Dalieh Campaign), Nahnoo (“We”) and The Alliance for 
the Lebanese Coast.3 
The Dalieh Campaign is a public-space focused collective founded in 2013 that gained prominence for its 
attempts to protect the Dalieh from privatisation. The Dalieh is a stretch of rocky coastline that includes 
Beirut’s symbolic Pigeon Rocks. The Dalieh Campaign is a small, non-hierarchical collective of architects, 
urbanists and designers that relies on crowdfunding to finance its initiatives. Nahnoo started out as a club at 
the Lebanese University in 2003 and evolved into an NGO focused broadly on “social cohesion” in 2009. Its 
work relies on a core leadership structure and a network of volunteers. Its remit would come to centre on 
public space and urban issues, and its reputation as an influential advocacy group was sedimented in 2015 
with the success of its lengthy campaign to have Horsh Beirut, the largest green space in the city, partially 
reopened.4 The Alliance for the Lebanese Coast was initiated in 2017 by the Dalieh Campaign and two other 
environmental/urbanist groups from the South and North of Lebanon. It brought together campaigns and 
organisations from across the country, including Nahnoo, to develop a strategy for protecting Lebanon’s 
coast from privatisation, in an attempt to move away from site-specific advocacy and address the issue of 
public space on a national scale. 
I gained access to these organisations through friends who had collaborated with them, and my approach 
to ethnographic fieldwork involved placing as much emphasis on participation as it did observation. In the 
case of the Dalieh Campaign in particular, I immersed myself within the collective, and played an active role 
in all aspects of its work. My interlocutors welcomed me into their spaces as an ethnographer, but they 
wouldn’t allow me to be just an ethnographer. I was too familiar, sharing a middle-class background and 
Western education with most of my interlocutors, albeit while bearing the characteristics of someone who 
wasn’t quite as local as they were – an obvious child of the Lebanese diaspora, but one that was close by, in 
the Arabian Gulf. I felt ethically compelled to offer labour and commitment in exchange for being folded 
into their spaces. It was expected of me to invest, and to want a better Lebanon.  
Anecdotes from the field are complemented by material from open-ended, both semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews that I carried out regularly with interlocutors.5 These were more often approached as 
 
3 During my fieldwork in the aftermath of the Hirak, the NGOs and collectives that comprise this movement had come to play 
a prominent role within Lebanon’s civil society, as many activists turned their attention towards questions of liveability and 
wellbeing that were believed capable of attracting mass appeal in ways more contentious issues were not.  
4 Horsh Beirut had been closed to the public since 1992.  
5 Upon allowing me access to their spaces, my interlocutors consented either verbally or via email to my use of observations 
gathered in the meetings and events they organised, and interviews were always framed as being conducted for research 
purposes. In cases where new participants/volunteers entered the fray, I would re-establish my role as an ethnographer and 









conversations rather than Q&As, recorded and transcribed, and carried out in a mix of English and Arabic 
with all translations being my own.6 Juris and Khasnabish (2015) argue that ethnographic methods are not 
prevalent within the conventional literature on social movements, despite the fact that anthropologists have 
written extensively about social movements. Such work, they write, “remains disconnected from dominant 
trends in the study of social movements in sociology and political science” (578).  
This article aims to contribute to attempts at demonstrating the usefulness of ethnographic methods for 
theorising about social movements, particularly for illuminating the role that affect and emotions play in 
structuring and reproducing them. Ethnography allows for the capturing of “the subjective mood, tone, and 
feeling of social movement events, activities, and encounters” (Juris and Khasnabish 2015, 579). More than 
just document what social movements do and what they say, ethnographers are well-positioned to capture 
their sensorial and visceral dimensions.  
 
3. Affect, Dissent and Middle-Class Subjectivities  
 
In the introduction to the anthology The Intimate Life of Dissent, the editors write that “in the popular 
imagination, dissidents are moved by a commitment to what is right or wrong that transcends their own 
narrow self-interest and personal ties” (Amarasuriya et al.  2020, 4). By contrast, they argue that not only are 
dissidents and activists committed to more than abstract ideals and grand schemes (Schielke 2015; Salman 
and Assies 2017; see also Biagini in this Special Issue), but that their commitments to these ideals and 
schemes are often entangled with personal desires and aspirations as well as a sense of responsibility and 
love towards those they share the world with. 
Activism, then, is informed not only by “commitments to high principles” (Amarasuriya et al. 2020, 4), 
but also by “specific intimate attachments of kinship, friendship and solidarity” (2020, 4), as well as the 
particularities of a habitus and the “aspirations and anxieties” it is productive of (Heiman, Liechty, and 
Freeman 2012, 6). “Dissidents are not simply lone individuals with abstract ideals; they are also caught up in 
other, sometimes contradictory aspirations and relationships and forms of responsibility” (Amarasuriya et al. 
2020, 3). It is crucial that we pay attention to social movements and activist organisations as spaces of 
intimacy and desire if we want to make sense of their form and content and the directions in which they 
evolve. 
In her work on AIDS activism in the 1980s and 90s in the United States, Gould (2009) critiques the 
emphasis, within the study of social movements, on the “rationality” of dissenters.7 “Protesters are construed 
as rational actors in the sense that they engage in reasonable, thoughtful, strategic behaviour designed to 
achieve their sensible goals” (15), and in the process the role of their emotions in shaping their activism is 
denied. The emotional turn in the study of social movements developed in the 1990s in response to this 
lacuna. Gould draws on but also develops the literature in the emotional turn. Gould departs from the 
 
6 It is typical amongst Lebanon’s cosmopolitan middle-class for conversations to be carried out bi- or tri-lingually, in a mix of 
Arabic and English, Arabic and French, or Arabic, English and French.  
7 Gould (2009) explains that this emphasis on rationality emerged, in the 1970s, as a response to what was then the dominant 
paradigm for the study of what was referred to as “collective behaviour”. The collective behaviour literature approached 
protest as a product of psychological instability. Scholarship on social movement studies that materialised in the 1970s 









emotional turn’s framing of emotions “in overly cognitive terms,” drawing attention to “the noncognitive, 
nonconscious, nonlinguistic, and nonrational aspects of the general phenomenon of emotion” (19).8  
Gould calls for a folding in of affect into the study of social movements, drawing on Brian Massumi’s 
work to describe affect as “nonconscious, unnamed, but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily 
energy and intensity that arise in response to stimuli impinging on the body” (Gould 2009, 19). Importantly, 
affect does not necessarily “line up with our rational selves” and yet is a “constant motivational force in 
individual lives and thus a force in social life as well” (22). This is why I argue that an attentiveness to affect 
when studying activism allows us to think contradictions without intention. To say affect is non-rational is 
not to claim irrationality, but to point to that which is “outside of – but not necessarily contrary to – 
conscious, cognitive sense-making” (Gould 2009, 24). An attentiveness to affect allows us to contend with 
overlooked aspects of activist social reproduction. 
In my work on middle-class activists in Beirut, I am invested in thinking about the effects of their 
emotional habitus. If habitus refers to “the processes – bodily, nonconscious, affective – through which 
actors are conscripted, unwittingly but willingly, into the social,” emotional habitus refers to a kind of 
“emotional pedagogy, a template for what and how to feel, in part by conferring on some feelings and modes 
of expression an axiomatic, natural quality and making other feeling states unintelligible within its terms and 
thus in a sense unfeelable and inexpressible” (Gould 2009, 34). What was the “reigning emotional habitus” 
(2009, 36) amongst middle-class activists in Beirut’s permanent present?  
Heiman, Liechty and Freeman (2012) write that “styles of consumption, modes of production (immaterial 
and material), approaches to reproduction, and motivations for citizen action are often inextricably connected 
in middle-class practices and subjectivities, and they are often imbued with affective traces of aspiration and 
anxiety and the desire for a feeling of security or belonging” (8). They argue that “middle classes emerge 
under certain socio-economic and historical conditions of possibility that allow us to conceptualise the 
middle class as a coherent category of social analysis,” but insist “that the term’s analytical coherence should 
not obscure the fact that, in actual practice, middle-class dynamics play out in potentially infinite ways” (12). 
They emphasise, crucially, that although the middle classes are economically privileged when compared to 
the working classes, middle-class subjectivities are also pervaded by “feelings of insecurity” (19). They 
argue that “central to the ontology of middle-class subjects across cultural and national boundaries” is a 
“longing to secure” (19), which we can attribute to the normalisation of crisis and precarity across scales of 
privilege.  
Despite their relative privilege, middle-class subjects grapple routinely with an anxiety and nervousness in 
response to “the volatility now being experienced by most classed subjects” (Heiman, Liechty, and Freeman 
2012, 20). For Heiman, Liechty and Freeman, middle-class subjects are burdened simultaneously by anxiety 
and aspiration, and what distinguishes them is the embodied sense of being able to slip into the working-
classes but also climb the socio-economic ladder.  
There is, then, an affective contour to middle classness that it is important to explore when making sense 
of middle-class activism. How did the middle-class aspirations and anxieties of my interlocutors shape their 
activism? Heiman, Liechty and Freeman (2012) highlight the “affective load of in-betweenness, or middle-
ness, characteristic of middle-class life” (23). In what follows, I think with this in-betweenness in the context 
of Lebanon’s civil society.  
 
 
8 Gould (2009) argues that social movement scholars from within the emotional turn were burdened by a concern that emotion 
would be equated with irrationality, and therefore they “overly cognitivised and rationalised political feelings” (23). Gould  









4. The Rise of the Urbanists 
 
Reflecting on a series of events organised by the Dalieh Campaign in May and June 2017 in a draft of a 
report shared with campaign members, Jana, an established Iraqi architect based in Beirut and founding 
member of the campaign, points out that political turbulence and economic precarity in the Middle East had 
provided urbanists with “abundant time to fight for natural and cultural heritage protection in Lebanon.”9 
Many, she explained,  
 
“myself included, are in design-related professions with a strong environmental sensibility and a penchant 
for social justice. With opportunities for professional work in architecture, landscape architecture, urban 
and graphic design dwindling, many channelled their energy and creativity by volunteering as campaigners 
for causes that have been undermined by the neoliberal economy taking over the country and the blatant 
suppression of the public right to the city. Caring for our heritage, both natural and cultural, is one such 
cause. True volunteering doesn’t pay the phone bill or put food on the table, but the rewards of upholding 
the right of those citizens whose voices have been silenced, accrues dividends that can’t be measured in 
monitory [sic] terms [emphasis added].” 
 
The desire to exert a measure of control over the conditions shaping and constraining one’s life, as well as 
the desire for self-fulfilment in a country widely considered as stifling as Lebanon, played an important, 
motivational role for my interlocutors. Amongst the mostly middle-class urban activists I worked with, there 
was an awareness of how their knowledge capital could be instrumentalised. My interlocutors appeared 
driven by a sense of duty rooted in the privilege of having the resources to cultivate this capital, and by the 
gratification that could be derived from acting on this sense of duty when one had few other opportunities to 
inject meaning into one’s life.  
They all shared cultural and knowledge capital that made Lebanon seem wholly inadequate, aware as they 
were of the workings of urban infrastructure and public services in other countries, which they had visited or 
lived in as students, trainees or conference and workshop participants, and which they had studied as models 
to aspire to. They couldn’t shake their belief in the feasibility of erecting similar structures and applying 
similar processes in Lebanon.   
“I can afford to go to the beach,” Alia, a founding member of the Dalieh Campaign and a prominent 
urbanist and researcher, told me, “but I don’t want to pay to go to the beach. Not because I can’t, but 
because…I don’t want to call it ideological, but I have a set of beliefs and they are linked to what I’ve read 
and what I’ve learned, and what I think about justice. There’s something in my  experience that makes this 
reality unacceptable. Of course, it’s linked to what I’ve studied. I don’t come from a revolutionary or leftist 
family. I guess it’s what you get exposed to and what you make of it.”  
It felt impossible for Alia to accept to have no say in how her city and country were run. “One of the main 
ideas behind the right to the city and urban rights is to say that you have a right to say your opinion about 
your city and about how it’s changing and to change it in ways you want and think are important,” she told 
me. This insistence on having a say can be understood to derive from these activists’ confidence in their 
expertise as urban planners, designers, engineers whose talents were being wasted, as well as from feelings 
of embarrassment and frustration towards a country whose “corruption” and “inadequacy” did not reflect or 
represent these activists.  
 








There is nothing new about Lebanon’s contemporary professional middle class’ disenchantment with the 
country. The activists I worked with belonged to a tradition of middle-class disillusionment and the urban 
activism it had been generative of, which can be traced back to the beginnings of the twentieth century. 
Watenpaugh (2006) describes the rise of a Levantine middle class in the aftermath of the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908, which asserted its “modernity” as a distinguishing factor both from the ruling Sunni 
Muslim oligarchy and the urban and lower rural working classes. Despite its cultural capital, this class, like 
its contemporary iteration, was deprived access to structures of power, which it challenged through appeals 
to the “right to equality, citizenship, and political participation in the idiom of modernity” (8). Writing more 
specifically about the emergence of a middle class in Ottoman Beirut at the turn of the twentieth century, 
Abou-Hodeib (2017) explains that what distinguished this stratum of society was “education, upward 
mobility, and an investment in the city’s position” (16).  
When I was carrying out my fieldwork, I also observed a distinct habitus that distinguished Beirut’s 
cosmopolitan professional middle class, one that cannot, I think, be disassociated from the genealogy traced 
by historians like Watenpaugh and Abou-Hodeib. It is important to elaborate on which Lebanese middle 
class I am referring to. When I refer to the middle class in this article, I am referring to a sub-section of the 
broader economic category – what we might consider an upper-tier with enhanced financial capabilities 
distinguished by a cosmopolitan lifestyle enabled by physical and cultural mobility. In Global South 
contexts, scholars have noted the “rise of a segment of the middle-class whose members are noticeably more 
affluent and more globally oriented than other members of the middle-class. These people enjoy the Western 
style of life, speak English, feel comfortable in foreign culture, and exhibit a global orientation in their work 
and leisure” (Koo 2016, 442). Koo (2016) calls this a “global middle class”, defined by its “consumption 
patterns and social identity more than by mere income status” (443). Others have referred to this as a 
cosmopolitan middle class.10 It is with this globally-oriented or cosmopolitan sub-section of the middle class 
in the Lebanese context that I concern myself.  
Bourdieu identified an “over-involvement” on the part of the middle classes in the political and cultural 
spheres, linking it to nurturing environments where “taste, disposition and know-how, not to mention the 
inherited ‘ticket’ of cultural capital, such as a university degree” cultivated a desire to engage in the 
“political public sphere” (Crossley 2002, 175). The habitus of Beirut’s cosmopolitan middle class also 
depended on this type of cultural capital, one that had nurtured a desire for a Lebanon that was better suited 
to the tastes of this class, and to its “ethics of consumption” (Abou-Hodeib 2017, 6).  
It is this habitus, I think, that encouraged activists like Mansour, who founded and headed Nahnoo, to 
proclaim: “I have something inside that tells me I can change things.” Nabila of the Dalieh Campaign was 
generating a lot of money as a senior landscape architect for one of the country’s leading architectural firms, 
but she couldn’t turn a blind eye to the corruption she argued had infected the private as well as the public 
sphere. She saw immense potential in the country and didn’t want to participate in hindering it, so she quit 
her job to focus on urban activism full-time. In our conversations, she would draw on her knowledge of other 
contexts to explain her visions for Lebanon and the source of her desire for such visions. Expertise and 
knowledge capital, in this case, were productive of particular anxieties about what Lebanon was not, and 
desires for what it could become; desires and anxieties that were entangled with such figures’ professional 
aspirations given that that they were equipped with the skills needed to manifest the visions they advocated 
for. 
 
10 See Moussawi (2018) for a useful breakdown of scholarly debates on the concept of cosmopolitanism, and for an 









My interlocutors seemed to derive pleasure from their victories, however small or ephemeral; a pleasure 
rooted in their positionality as activists who were driven towards causes because of their professional 
background – from a need to feel useful, but also to be taken seriously; to have their authority recognised. 
Many spoke proudly to me about the relationships they had cultivated with particular ministries. While they 
bemoaned having had to pick up the slack of state institutions, they also acknowledged how much they 
gained from such efforts, broadening their networks, receiving work opportunities, but also coming to be 
relied upon by official governmental bodies.  
In 2015, for example, the Dalieh Campaign organised “Revisiting Dalieh”, an ideas competition to open 
up the debate around the site and create awareness, inviting proposals for holistic rehabilitation plans for the 
Dalieh. Importantly for the campaign, the competition unfolded under the patronage of the Ministry of 
Environment. Nabila asked me excitedly during one of our conversations if I comprehended what this meant. 
“We convinced the Ministry of Environment to launch the competition in their space – imagine! You’re 
organising a competition about land that is privately owned, and the Ministry of Environment is involved. 
What does this mean? It’s a message or indirect declaration that this site is public.”11 
In our conversations, Mansour boasted about Nahnoo’s evolution from consulting with experts in 2012 to 
being paid for its own expertise. The organisation rarely applied for funding: “Foreign funders come to us.” 
And, he prided himself on having cultivated relationships with the governor and the mayor, on being able to 
approach them for documents, to meet and negotiate with them, all the while confronting them publicly 
when he didn’t get his way. He’d become, in his framing, a power broker.  
“There should be a purpose for your professional evolution for a form of activism to survive,” Balkis of 
the Dalieh Campaign told me. “It’s not easy to find the right marriage. The people most active, this is core to 
their work. This is what helps the sustainability. To continue, there should be a purpose for your professional 
evolution.” Sally, a practicing urban planner and member of the Dalieh Campaign, learned about the Dalieh 
through her interest in landscape architecture. She bemoaned the free labour that campaign members put into 
the site, taking on duties that should have been carried out by governmental institutions. But she also 
acknowledged the personal gains the campaign members accrued.  
Thinking back on how she ended up heavily involved in more than a decade of urban activism, the Dalieh 
Campaign’s Nour, who studied graphic design at the American University of Beirut, told me she was 
particularly influenced by one professor who taught her students the relationship between design and social 
responsibility. “The designer has a lot of power, and she should be careful how she uses it, because she can 
create discourse and change discourse, and set the culture of a place. We have a strong tool in our hands, and 
we should be aware of it.” 
I didn’t know Nour could speak Portuguese until more than a year into working alongside her. One 
evening, I joined a small group of collaborators and friends gathered at her home to offer her childhood 
friend and partner in a research and design studio focused on urban issues well wishes after the sudden 
passing of a close relative. Nour spent much of the evening on her feet, prodding people to eat the snacks she 
had prepared, checking on the baking Pao de Queijo she’d made with ingredients hand-delivered from Sao 
Paulo, and translating from English and Arabic to Portuguese for the Brazilian friend visiting her. After a 
year of witnessing and experiencing the frustration and cyclical sense of defeat that had come to define, for 
many, activism in Beirut, I couldn’t understand how and why Nour persisted when she had a viable 
elsewhere to escape to – one where she was already a naturalised citizen; where she had plenty of relatives; 
 
11 Despite being privately owned, the Dalieh had long functioned as a public space. “The land had originally been owned by 
several Beirut families who had been custodians since Ottoman times. No building was allowed, and the land was available to 








where language wouldn’t serve as a barrier; where her skills as a graphic designer, teacher and urbanist 
would surely be desirable; and where, she told me, there existed a robust grassroots urban activist scene that 
she could become involved with.  
“If I wasn’t an activist working on things in the country, I wouldn’t stay here,” Nour told me. “The 
country doesn’t offer me anything. It’s a catastrophe. Daily life is exhausting. It wastes your time. I’m here 
because I have hope that I can change things. Because the country is small, you can create a network 
between different issues and people, and you feel like you can change things. In bigger countries, activism 
tends to be very grassroots and strong, but it’s very difficult for these movements to think of running for 
elections, for example. Here, imagine, we [Beirut Madinati] were about to win municipal elections! There’s 
room here.”12  
Urban activists like Nour regularly expressed a desire to make up for lost and wasted time resulting from 
the conditions of life in Lebanon; to inject meaning into their lives through activism. Survival was not often 
what was at stake for these activists, but rather, purpose and pride, and so it makes sense that emigration 
would not be the more desirable option for such highly-skilled individuals, compared to deploying their 
skills in a context compact enough that “successes” could be conceivably logged within its territory. I have 
placed “successes” in quotation marks because, as I have attempted to show in this section, the determining 
factor in what made something an activist success for my interlocutors was not necessarily the scale or 
impact of a particular strategy or action, but its effect on their sense of self.  
The desire to not have one’s talents wasted, to cultivate a more acceptable Lebanon where one did not feel 
completely devoid of purpose or belonging, can be seen as one source of the drive to continue with activism 
despite the likelihood of failure. This desire, however, and the context within which it has been cultivated, 
not only propels but shapes middle-class approaches to contentious politics in contemporary Beirut, as I will 
demonstrate in the following sections.  
  
5. Failure, “Stuckedness” and Neoliberal Time  
 
In the introduction, I mentioned that my interlocutors were grappling with the routinisation of failure 
within Lebanon’s activist scene. It is important to point out that my use of “failure” is emic. I understand my 
interlocutors’ invocation of the term “failure” not to be a means, so much, of condemning themselves or their 
predecessors, but of commenting on the context within which they have had to operate and the ways in 
which this context has hindered them. I am interested, moreover, in thinking with failure as a structure of 
feeling (Williams 1977). Failure, then, is not a diagnostic through which I evaluate Lebanese civil society’s 
work, but a ghost whose uninterrupted haunting I argue has had an important effect on the form that activism 
in the country takes, as well as why and how it has been able to persist. Failure as a structure of feeling, I 
argue, has paradoxically enabled rather than disabled Lebanese civil society, albeit in particular directions.13  
 
12 Beirut Madinati (Beirut My City) was an independent electoral campaign that participated in the country’s 2016 municipal 
elections, and with which Nour was intimately involved. Beirut Madinati snagged around 30 percent of the vote but lost the 
overall election.  
13 I follow social movement scholars who call for a rethinking of the binary between success and failure. Haiven and 
Khasnabish (2013), for example, argue that this binary keeps us from approaching social movements as “living spaces of 
encounter, possibility, contestation and conflict” (479). To focus on the why and how of success or failure is to belie the fact 
that social movements more often than not dwell in what Haiven and Khasnabish (2013) call the “hiatus” between not-success 
and not-failure. The bulk of social movement labour, according to such scholars, is actually invested in the hiatus, in the 









In his research on activists in Lebanon, Musallam (2019) writes that his interlocutors described a feeling 
of “failure in the air” – not “failure-as-setback, but rather failure-as-‘atmosphere’” (35). Musallam explains 
that his interlocutors experienced failure “as something beyond themselves” (36), and I heard a similar 
sentiment expressed during my time in the field. Failure was framed as a product of particular conditions of 
(im)possibility; of the entrenchment of the status quo, the Lebanese ruling class and sectarian-neoliberalism.  
I understand life in Lebanon to be characterised by a sense of existential stuckedness (Hage 2015) born of 
crisis turned ordinary (Berlant 2011). Hage (2015) writes that on a global scale within our neoliberal 
conjuncture, “rather than being perceived as something that one needs to get out of at any cost,” stuckedness 
is “experienced, ambivalently, as an inevitable pathological state that has to be endured” (Chapter 2). Within 
this context, the political imagination has been emaciated, and our ability to imagine alternatives to the status 
quo has been severely diminished.  
In Cruel Optimism, Berlant (2011) asks what happens to “fantasies of the good life” (3) when crisis is 
made ordinary and precarity is made ubiquitous. They write that “across diverse geopolitical and biopolitical 
locations, the present moment increasingly imposes itself on consciousness as a moment in extended crisis, 
with one happening piling on another” (7). Fisher (2009) refers to this impasse as “capitalist realism”, “the 
widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system,” but that “it is 
now impossible to imagine a coherent alternative to it” (2).  
Both Berlant and Fisher argue that under the entangled regimes of crisis ordinariness and capitalist 
realism, people become fixated on finding ways to live on within the permanent present rather than live 
towards the future-impossible. What happens to activism, I ask, amidst the “attrition of fantasy” (Berlant 
2011, 11)? What happens when world-making comes to be detached from the future? Affective responses, 
Berlant (2011) tells us, “may be said significantly to exemplify shared historical time” (15). What can the 
emotional habitus of Lebanese civil society tell us about capitalist time and what can it tell us about the 
relationship between class subjectivity and cruel optimism as it manifests in activist spaces?  
What Berlant (2011) calls cruel optimism is a relation that exists “when something you desire is actually 
an obstacle to your flourishing.” Optimism turns cruel, they write, “when the object that draws your 
attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially” (2). I argue that what Musallam (2019) 
calls “failure-as-atmosphere” turned, more often than not, the relation that my interlocutors had with their 
activism into one of cruel optimism – the desire to do activism a certain way and with certain people, despite 
also recognising that these choices and strategies hindered long-term growth. Personal joy, satisfaction, 
pleasure and growth in the present, I argue, were often chosen over the future. Activism became a means of 
performing a version of the good life rather than facilitating it. To make sense of middle-class activism as a 
relation of cruel optimism in Lebanon, it is important, I argue, to think through the effects of neoliberalism 
not only as a governing rationality but, following Berlant, Hage and Fisher, as a temporal orientation.  
In the next section, I want to dwell further on this temporal orientation, moving from the factors enabling 
the perseverance of the activists with whom I worked, to those enabling fracturing or and breakdown. 
 
6. The Social Life of Social Movements 
 
Hermez (2015) argues that it is more common for many in Lebanon to view the sectarian-political system 
as “reflective of a non-state” (509). He writes that “in the imagination of its various citizens, the state exists 
 
persistence,” Haiven and Khasnabish (2013) argue, is “a vital one for researchers to study” because, among other reasons, “it 









in the subjunctive mood, as something that would be rather than as something that is” (509). People aim for 
and desire a “stronger, more accountable, and more bureaucratic and Weberian form” of the state (510) but 
negotiate with the state in ways that actually push this fantasy further from reality by, for example, taking 
advantage of clientelism in order to survive. He refers to this as a cynical relation to the state, wherein people 
recognise that their actions allow what they frame as the weak, failed or corrupt state to persist, but are 
unable to remove themselves from this dynamic because these negotiations constitute their means of 
surviving. “The cynical reasoning,” he writes, “stems from people knowing how things are (they know their 
political engagement will not yield real change) but acting as if they don’t know. I contend that they do this 
to, among other things, survive and manage everyday life, and for self-preservation” (517). Cynical relations 
emerge from “the absence of alternatives and an inability to imagine another horizon of possibility” (515).  
Building off Hermez (2015), I see the middle-class activists I worked with as orienting themselves “in a 
demystified world by focusing on self-preservation and self-advancement” (516). But I argue that cynicism 
cannot fully account for the emotional attachment that my interlocutors had to their activism. Cynicism, I 
argue, linked as it is to a dearth of alternatives and the decline of the political imagination, cannot account for 
the persistence of the activist dynamics and strategies I observed in moments bursting with political 
potential, such as the October Revolution of 2019. 
To make sense of this persistence, we have to factor in what we might call “nonrational” (Gould 2009) or 
“stubborn” affect or, following from Berlant, cruel optimism – the inability to detach from modes of coping 
and getting by even when opportunities for transformative rupture present themselves, because these modes 
were not only necessary but gratifying on a personal level. This is an approach to neoliberal time that 
requires that we grapple with embodiment and affect, with what it means to have been made to long inhabit 
the present as permanent and crisis as ordinary.  
In his theorisation of capitalist realism, Fisher (2009) argues that the term is also meant to describe the 
sense of purpose and fulfilment that those positioned against a capitalism to which no realistic alternative can 
be imagined derive from committing themselves to the belief that it is “bad”, regardless of whether they 
continue to “participate in capitalist exchange” (13).This, I argue, can help us make sense of the commitment 
that many activists in Lebanon have to practices they acknowledge are unlikely to assist them in inching 
towards their own grander visions. The civil society scene I participated in was shaped by a particular kind of 
haunting – the spectre that everything was for nothing. As my fieldwork unfolded, I watched my 
interlocutors behave in ways they themselves often acknowledged were counter-productive in relation to 
their long-term goals. There was something to be gained from persevering with particular strategies in the 
present when more radical alternatives were felt to be impossible to achieve.  
Many Lebanese social movements and activist organisations have collapsed under the weight of internal 
conflict. AbiYaghi, Catusse and Younes (2017) argue that anti-sectarian movements in Lebanon “face a kind 
of sectarian trap in which sectarian discourses appear to reproduce themselves” (84). I am reluctant, 
however, to diagnose the fragmentation that seems to characterise Lebanese civil society as indicative of the 
country’s “culture” of sectarianism manifesting amongst anti-sectarian actors. Rather, I think it more fruitful 
to turn to neoliberal rationality’s role in cultivating a pervasive commitment to entrepreneurial individualism, 
as well as the pleasure that can be derived from activism, and the desire not to have one’s enjoyment sullied 
by others with whom one does not particularly enjoy collaborating – even when that desire gets in the way of 
the entrepreneurial drive.  
Khneisser (2018) writes of the “high level of ‘ego’” (14) that her interviewees pointed to when describing 
the struggle between activists vying for leadership of the Hirak. But egoism, I observed, had an everyday 









Particularly palpable was the tension between some of the collectives and organisations who came together 
during my fieldwork to form The Alliance for the Lebanese Coast. 
The alliance meetings I attended were often punctuated by passive aggressiveness, attempts to position 
some forms of knowledge, expertise or experience as more relevant than others, and an obsessive need to call 
out anyone perceived to be attempting to creep into a position of leadership. Some, for example, were 
frustrated by the desire to reschedule meetings if particular prominent activists could not attend, with the 
latter assumed to be attempting to position themselves as de facto leaders of what was meant to be a 
horizontal collective.  
At a volunteer meeting for one of the more prominent NGOs involved with the alliance that was called to 
discuss a protest related to yet another threatened site in the city, the head of the organisation explained that 
he’d invited another group to write and read out a collective statement during the protest. Shocked, one of 
the volunteers asked why he would do that when his organisation was the primary organiser. “They can have 
the protest,” he responded. “It’s only our name in the press anyway. What does a rich guy care about giving a 
poor guy 1,000 LL?”  
This organiser saw humility in his organisation’s discretion, but others saw this approach as suspiciously 
covert – a strategy for cunningly coming to dominate issues. A member of one of the more informal 
collectives involved in the alliance explained that despite being a member of the collective’s wider net of 
volunteers, the NGO head mentioned above did not share relevant information with them despite having 
access to their data.  
 
 “Anytime we ask him for anything, he refers us to their website where the logo is so huge you can’t 
 print anything. All of our stuff is published. He says something, then he goes to the governor and says 
 something else. He works independently, doesn’t coordinate with anyone, and then screws up your 
 work. How can you cooperate with the governor when we are in battle against him? We are working 
 over the table and getting burned while he visits with the governor because he’s helping him with his 
 campaigns. It’s become an issue of personal stakes. We’re supposed to be fighting personal interest. 
 What guarantees to me that he won’t go to the governor and tell him everything we’re doing? How 
 can I trust him?” 
 
Members off the alliance whose collectives had purposely chosen a non-hierarchical approach to their 
organising that eschewed donor funds expressed a distaste for NGOs. One activist explained to me that 
NGOs “get a grant for a project, do it and put it in the drawer. Tell me, what are NGOs getting done?” She 
expressed trepidation with regards to NGOs that applied for funds aimed at addressing public spaces that 
these more informal groups had long campaigned on behalf of:  
 
 “They want to apply for a grant and take over the project. We object, and they say, what’s the big deal, 
 it’s public, do you own it? And we say, it’s not about owning it, but when you’re doing all the work 
 and working day and night on something – if I show you the hours of work, it’s worth thousands, 
 thousands of dollars… and they’re sitting there watching and not doing anything even though they are 
 technically supposed to be part of the campaign. What do they mean they’re going to go get a grant? 
 How can I trust someone like this?” 
 
But these NGOs felt similarly about the less structured collectives they shared the alliance with. In 2016, 








an event on a site that had already been heavily campaigned for by one of its members, the gathered activists 
discussed whether to work under the banner of the collective focused on the site, or to present themselves as 
a coalition of independent groups working together for the site. Members of the collective insisted that, given 
their campaign’s existence and success, the network should line up behind it. The second in command of one 
of the more prominent NGOs in attendance objected. “Strategy should never be finalised and imposed – it 
should be routinely revised. If we are partners, we should be able to amend the strategy, not just implement 
someone else’s strategy.” Members of the collective being addressed were visibly distressed. One noted, 
“what you’re saying scares me,” taking the NGO representative aback. “The campaign is active, working 
with ministries and international organisations. If we want a collaboration, we need to work within the 
strategy that was three years in the making.” The NGO representative held onto this articulation of “fear”, 
unable to fathom why her desire to share her recommendations should be met with such trepidation. “To 
build an alliance we have to trust each other,” she responded. “Of course, if the strategy is great, we’ll 
implement it, but if we have things to add we should be able to discuss them.” The altercation came up the 
following week during a volunteer meeting organised by this NGO. “Why fear?” the head of the organisation 
asked: “It’s all ego. Wanting to be the face of these things. Why are they afraid of partnership? We could 
have organised the event ourselves on a larger scale.” 
These NGOs and collectives needed collaborations to get where they wanted to go, and they often asserted 
that they were confident their organisations would always find a way to shine. However, these displays of 
confidence and ostensible commitment to taking a backseat in a gesture of goodwill to enable collaboration 
were contradicted by the anxiety displayed about being overshadowed, which came out in the seemingly 
endless tug of war for influence, which threatened to hinder if not collapse the coalition they were trying to 
collectively build. 
Khaled, of the non-profit Green Line, which had been active since the 1990s, criticised the blanket 
“demonisation” of NGOs articulated by collectives like the one discussed above. “They lump NGOs with 
political parties. We’re demons. Why? Because we get funds. Okay, tomorrow you organise an activity and 
do it without funds.” But Green Line had a tense relationship with other NGOs, particularly those that had 
addressed the issue of Horsh Beirut after Green Line had campaigned for the site for years, only to be 
eclipsed by their success. Khaled explained that the younger generation of activists did not want “to 
recognise the work done before.” He observed a tendency to claim that “there was nothing before,” as a 
means of activists inflating their own work and their profiles. He continued: 
 
“Who is going to take responsibility for institutional memory? It’s missing and we have to develop it. We 
have to clean things up so we can have harmony in our approach to long-term objectives, or else we will 
be easy to defeat. Politicians already have tons of NGOs. Selfishness is being nurtured as we try to raise 
awareness and introduce common thinking about the social. Individualism is being nurtured, because it’s 
only through individualism that people get what they want. Everyone wants to be on the media. Civil 
society is not unified. Few are the people willing to risk their own personal reputation and interests. These 
new movements they tell us, let us live our own experiences. But I’ve been around for 25 years. I don’t 
have the luxury of time to wait for you to learn.” 
 
Accounts of tension and competitiveness amongst activists in Lebanon can perhaps be explained through 
recourse to Brown’s (2005) discussion of how neoliberal rationality has reshaped practices of citizenship. 
“The body politic ceases to be a body but is, rather, a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers” (43). 
Ideal neoliberal citizens are “rational, calculating creatures” (42), invested primarily in self-care, in 









Lebanon’s activist scene solely through the analytical lens of neoliberal entrepreneurialism leaves something 
to be desired. It is, I think, an essential part of the story – we have, after all, seen the role that professional 
considerations play in propelling many towards activism and shaping their approaches to it. What it doesn’t 
completely account for, at least not explicitly, however, is the fact that the ubiquity of competitiveness, 
egoism and cliquishness amongst activists gets in the way of their own personal ambitions, acknowledge as 
most of them do that coalition work is the only way forward – that they can’t get where they need to go on 
their own. 
While some of their decisions might seem “rational” and “calculating”, activists also often seemed 
incapable of the collaboration across collectives and organisations that they had deemed necessary for 
meeting their own individual aspirations. What I have tried to show is that the activists with whom I worked 
did not only derive enjoyment from the successes of their activism, but also often sacrificed their own 
progress to hold on to their particular ways of doing things, which is why I have labelled this a relation of 
cruel optimism following from Berlant, rather than a merely cynical relation. This desire to cling to the peers 
one was used to collaborating with, the strategies one had thought up, did not always stem from a process of 
rationalisation, but was also rooted in the enjoyment that could be derived from one’s own activist routine in 
a context and conjuncture where most of my interlocutors acknowledged that they were unlikely to log big 
wins. 
This can be further illustrated through a brief discussion of the atmospheric discrepancy between the 
Dalieh Campaign’s meetings and those of the alliance. I began volunteering with the Dalieh Campaign as 
part of my fieldwork in the summer of 2016. The first meeting I attended was boisterous. Campaign 
members hadn’t met in months, because they had all been busy with different aspects of Beirut Madinati’s 
municipal campaign. After almost an hour devoted to hugs and kisses, catch ups and jokes, the latest gossip 
and rumours, the group got down to business. The meeting and those that followed it, while in many ways 
serious, also often felt like what in colloquial Lebanese Arabic is referred to as a sobhiyyeh – a morning 
social gathering of friends over coffee, tea and treats. Campaign members knew one another on a 
professional and a personal basis; they were friends, non-biological kin even, sometimes co-workers. They 
attended one another’s Christmas parties and iftars; they celebrated birthdays, marriages and births together; 
teased one another.  
Their WhatsApp group, which I remained a part of after leaving the field, was a convivial space, more 
often one for exchanging personal updates than for sharing professional or activist news. By contrast, the 
WhatsApp group for the coastal alliance was used only for activist business, and the alliance’s meetings were 
often tense and stiff. The activists I otherwise knew as funny, light-hearted, wise crackers wore unfamiliar 
faces in that space; their gestures were different: forced smiles, slouching, indicators of exasperation, 
boredom and tenseness, were more prevalent than those that signalled joy, comfort, and safety. An alliance 
meeting would not, or at least did not, during my time in Beirut, become dinner or drinks in the way a Dalieh 
meeting could. Alliance meetings felt painful, forced, burdensome, whereas Dalieh meetings felt effortless, 
despite the disagreements that often punctuated them. Such disagreements, unlike with the alliance, were 
often followed by laughter, teasing or other modes of defusing tension common to friendship circles.  
The Dalieh Campaign, however, could not save the coast on its own. It was unlikely to even save the 
Dalieh on its own. But despite the need for the alliance the coalition had, at the time of writing, quieted down 
substantially, whereas the Dalieh Campaign, while it was not as active as it was previously, remained a 
collective, remained ready to mobilise, its members encountering one another in other activist spaces they 
either co-founded or entered into together. I argue that the intimate nature of the campaign, the fact that it 








members not only got along with but enjoyed one another, has played a role in the collective’s longevity. 
The reverting to the intimate and familiar, the reluctance to continue with or the desire to abandon the 
tedious, uncomfortable or burdensome, I argue, needs to be made sense of in light of neoliberalism’s 
temporal effects and the emptying out of the future in our contemporary conjuncture, and in light of the 
embodied sense that this kind of labour was not worth much when substantial or transformative change was 




In this article, I have argued that, for many of my interlocutors, activism had become a “way of life” 
(Kiwan 2017); a good in itself, rather than a means towards a particular end. The activist spaces they moved 
between and the practices that informed them, regardless of their outcomes and wider impact, often appeared 
as goods in themselves, worthy for the personal, secular salvation they facilitated, for enabling a sense of the 
good life in a national context considered wholly corrupt and corrupting.  
Within these spaces, a minority of disenchanted middle-class denizens of Beirut were able to derive 
temporary gratification and fulfilment from a being together with those who longed for “a different way to 
cohabit the political” (Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 159), and from work that enriched their professional and 
personal lives. The reluctance to change one’s tactics or to collaborate, the fear of being “invaded”, can be 
seen to derive from a concern about the contamination of a carefully cultivated, intimate alter-ontological 
space and the subsequent disruption of one’s practice of the good life.  
I have discussed the relationship between middle-class subjectivity and the “doing” of activism as a means 
of feeding particular aspirations and quelling particular anxieties, and some of the consequences of an 
approach to activism as the good life rather than a means to the good life. This investment in “the activity of 
activism” (Kiwan 2017) rather than the telos of activism, I argue, was a product of a particular political and 
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